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Transfers of Copyrights for Security
Under the New Copyright Act
The use of copyrights as collateral security for loans was rare until
recent decades,' largely because literary and artistic property had little
economic significance.2 The advent of modem means of communica-
tion, however, has greatly increased the economic significance of
copyrights,3 so that today such rights are increasingly important as an
actual and potential source of collateral security, particularly in the
entertainment industry.4 This is a desirable trend, for the right to use
property to obtain credit is an important one that should inhere in
property created by federal statute no less than in more traditional
forms of property.5
1. I G. GILMoRE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 13.3, at 410 (1965).
2. Kaplan, Literary and Artistic Property (Including Copyright) as Security: Problems
Facing the Lender, 19 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 254, 254 (1954).
3. Economic statistics for industries that produce copyrightable material, such as the
publishing, greeting card, and motion picture industries, are not readily available, but as
early as 1954 the value of the output of such industries exceeded six billion dollars,
making the "copyrights industry" nearly as large as the automobile industry, and larger
than the mining, banking, or health services industries. HOUsE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
86TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION STUDY No. 2, at 28 (Comm. Print 1960).
By 1970, the motion picture industry alone accounted for $1.5 billion of the gross national
product. B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 422 (3d ed. 1978).
4. Kaplan, supra note 2, at 255; see HOUSE CotMs. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89"H CONG., 1ST
SEss., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 5, at 306 (Comm. Print 1965) (statement of Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc.) ("hypothecation" is "very important factor in copy-
right'). See generally Concoff, Motion Picture Secured Transactions under the Uniform
Commercial Code: Problems in Perfection, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1214 (1966). Although the
Copyright Office does not produce separate statistics on the use of assignments for
security, filings of assignments for security seem to be "increasingly common." Interview
with Mary Lyle, Copyright Office Programs Analyst and former Assistant Head of Assign-
ments Section, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (Mar. 8, 1978) (notes on file with
Yale Law Journal).
5. Freeman, The Copyright as Security, 12 KAN. ST. B.A.J. 257, 258 (1944). The principle
of free transferability of copyrights for security is now embodied in both federal and
state law. H.R. REP..No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE Co, . & AD. Naws 5738 (new Copyright Act embodies "principle of unlimited alien-
ability" of copyright, including by mortgage) [hereinafter cited as HOUsE REPORT with
page citations to [1976] U.S. CODE Co.NG. & AD. NEWs]; 1 G. GiLMsORE, supra note 1, at 290
(policy of Article 9 of U.C.C. is that "all types of personal property . . . should be
recognized as available for security").
The business that is unable to provide collateral security may have trouble obtaining
125
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Historically, difficulties of perfecting a security interest in intangible
property impeded transfers of copyrights for security, but Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code eliminated most of these impedi-
ments., Copyright law itself presented certain difficulties, but ob-
servers expected the new Copyright Act to remove these remaining
legal obstacles to copyright financing.7
Although the new Copyright Act" does remove the old obstacles to
transfers of copyrights for security, it erects new ones in their place,
which jeopardize the financial arrangements for the production of a
copyrightable work. Certain of the new provisions, notably the
registration requirement, threaten security interests in copyrights with
commercial credit. Almost 70% of all bank loans to business are secured by commercial
property, and small firms are particularly dependent on such loans. P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS
& G. DONALDSON, BASIC BUSINESS FINANCE 268 (1971). For businesses whose property consists
primarily of copyrights, the use of these copyrights as collateral can be extremely im-
portant. See Concoff, supra note 4, at 1227 (U.C.C. category of intangible property is "of
crucial importance in motion picture financing").
6. See NiNIMER ON COPYRIGHT § 121.2 (1976) (ability to create security interest in
common law copyright was "severely circumscribed" under pre-Code law); Freeman, supra
note 5, at 257 (noting reluctance of courts to recognize legitimacy of copyrights as
collateral).
Before the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, it was uncertain whether the
proper security instrument for a copyright was a mortgage or a pledge. Kaplan, supa
note 2, at 257-59. The Code does not provide that a copyright cannot be pledged, but it
makes clear that a security interest in a copyright cannot be perfected by pledge. See
U.C.C. § 9-106, Comment (copyrights are "general intangibles"); id. § 9-302(l) ("general
intangibles" not among classes of collateral excluded from general requirement of filing
financing statement to perfect security interest) [all citations herein to U.C.C. refer to
1972 Official Text and Comments]. It was also unclear whether compliance with record-
ing provisions of the Copyright Act would validate a mortgage for purposes of state law
if local filing provisions were not also complied with. Kaplan. supra note 2, at 259-61.
The Code removes this doubt by eliminating the local filing requirement when a federal
statute, such as the Copyright Act, provides for filing of security interests. U.C.C. § 9'
302(3), (4).
7. Under the old Copyright Act it was unclear whether a creditor who filed his mort-
gage after a statutory "grace period" would defeat a subsequent transferee. See Ditto,
Musical Copyright as Collateral in Secured Transactions, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SY'.tP.
219, 235-36 (1969); Note, Copyright as Collateral in a Seculed Transaction, 39 ST. Jon.x's
L. RE'. 90, 95-97 (1964). The new Act make,; clear that if this creditor is the first to
file, he wins eten if lie files after the "grace period." See Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. app. § 205(e) (197i). It was also unclear tinder the old law whether assignments of
partial lights, e.g., motion picture rights, were true assignments, which could be recorded
with the effect of constructie notice, or merely licenses, which could not. The new Act
provides that any. right, partial or otherwise, can be assigned and recorded. See id.
§ 201(d)(2) (any right may be transferred); id. § 205(a) (any transfer may be recorded).
The new Act also removes the uncertainty about whether a copyright can be pledged.
See id. § 204(a) ("a transfer of ownership is not valid unless an instrument of conveyance,
... is in writing").
Finally, by recogni/ing a statutory copsright from the moment a woik of authorship is
first fixed in a copy, thereby preempting the common law copyright, the new Act
eliminates the need to file two mortgages-one on the common law copyright and one on
the statutory copyright. See p. 134 infra; Concoff, supra note 4, at 1239-40.
8. Copyright Act of 1976. 17 U.S.C. app. §§ 101-810 (1976) (effective Jan. 1, 1978).
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subordination to the rights of subsequent transferees, lien creditors,
and trustees in bankruptcy. To eliminate these threats and to facilitate
secured transactions involving copyrights, this Note proposes an
amendment to the new Copyright Act.
I. Security Transfers of Unregistered Copyrights
Under the Old Copyright Act
The new Copyright Act recognizes a statutory copyright from the
moment a work is first fixed in a copy.9 Previously, a statutory copy-
right had subsisted only in a work that had been published with a
proper notice of copyright'0 or, if unpublished, had been registered
at the Copyright Office." Although under the old Act a "common law
copyright" existed in works of authorship until they qualified for
statutory protection,'2 the common law copyright was extinguished
when the statutory copyright was secured by publication or registra-
tion.13 An author who had mortgaged a common law copyright there-
9. Id. § 302(a) ("Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978, subsists from
its creation ...."); id. § 101 ("A work is 'created' when it is fixed in a copy or phono-
record for the first time; where a work is prepared over a period of time, the portion of
it that has been fixed at any particular time constitutes the work as of that time. ... );
id. (" *Copies' are material objects, other than phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by
any method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated .... )
10. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 10 (1970) (repealed 1976) ("Any person entitled
thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the
notice of copyright required by this title ....") The Copyright Act of 1909 was amended
many times before being superseded by the new Act, but this provision and all other
prosisions cited in this Note remained substantially unchanged until 1976. The copyright
law as it existed immediately prior to enactment of the new statute will, for convenience,
be referred to as the Copyright Act of 1909.
11. Id. § 12 ("Copyright may also be had for the works of an author, of which copies
are not reproduced for sale, by the deposit, with claim of copyright, of one complete copy
of such work .... )
12. Id. § 2 (nothing in Act "shall be construed to annul or limit the right of the author
or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to prevent the copy-
ing, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent"); see, e.g., Wheaton
v. Peters, 3:1 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834) ("That an author, at common law, has a property
in his manuscript, and may obtain redress against any one who deprives him of it, ...
cannot be doubted"); Biltmore Music Corp. v. Kittinger, 238 F.2d 373, 378 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 954 (1956) (composer of musical arrangement held to have "vested
propertv right" therein prior to application for statutory copyright); Loew's Inc. v.
Superior Court, 18 Cal. 2d 419, 115 P.2d 983 (1941) (apart from statute "law recognizes
certain rights of property in the original intellectual products of an author").
13. E.g., Wheaton v. Pctei, .; U.b. (8 Pet.) 391, 657 (1834) (claimant in infringement
suit could find protection only under copyright statute since publication had divested
author of common law copyright); White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1952) (com-
mon law copyright destroyed by author's general publication of manuscript). Curiously,
the only reported case in which the destruction of interests in copyright, other than those
of the owner, is considered is Daly v. Walrath, 40 A.D. 220, 57 N.Y.S. 1125 (1899) (licensee's
common law rights destroyed by author's publication of work even though publication
was in violation of contract with licensee).
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fore had the power to destroy the mortgagee's collateral by registering
or publishing his work and, thereby, to subordinate the mortgagee's
security interest to the interests of transferees of the statutory copy-
right.'14
Under the old Copyright Act, the risk of subordination arose only if
the security interest was taken before the statutory copyright had been
secured. Yet it is during this period, while the work is being produced,
that credit may be most needed. Independent motion picture producers,
for example, have always depended on outside financing during
production.15
14. Two other commentators have recognized this possibility, see Concoff, supra note
4, at 1237; Note, supra note 7, at 97, but thus far no case in which a mortgagee has lost
his interest to another party in this way has been reported. Typically, an assignment of a
copyright is subordinated to a later interest because it has not been properly recorded.
This was the case in Photo-Drama Motion Picture Co. v. Social Uplift Film Corp., 220 F.
448 (2d Cir. 1915), where Kauffman had assigned all dramatic rights in a book, including
motion picture rights, to Totten. Kauffman later assigned the same motion picture rights
to Photo-Drama, which was informed that the assignment to Totten did not include
motion picture rights. Photo-Drama recorded its assignment and therefore had rights
superior to those of Totten, who had not recorded. For other examples of multiple as-
signments, see, e.g., Venus Music Corp. v. Mills Music, Inc., 261 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958);
Kenya Music, Inc. v. Warner Bros., 391 F. Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
15. 1 A. LINDLEY, ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING AND THE ARTS: AGREEMENTS AND THE LAW
298 (Supp. 1977) (in past, independent producers were dependent on distributors for
financing; now they are turning to investment houses, venture capital corporations, and
other sources). For a sample of the wide array of financial sources available to motion
picture producers, see Setlowe, Hollywood's New Financial Tricks, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS:
AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY PRACTICE 53 (1972). The motion picture industry's need for out-
side financing should continue to grow, due both to the expanding role of the inde-
pendent producer and to the emergence of sources of new demand for film entertain-
ment. See Crandall, The Postwar Performance of the Motion-Picture Industry, 20 ANTI-
mUST BULL. 49, 51-52 (1975).
Outside of the motion picture industry, lending on the security of a copyright to
unpublished work is not unknown, see Richcar Music Co. v. Towns, 53 A.D.2d 501, 505
n.5, 385 N.Y.S.2d 778, 781 n.5 (1976), but it is comparatively rare. The lack of proven
value in unpublished written and musical works has been the common explanation for
the infrequent use of copyrights as collateral, see Ditto, supra note 7, at 237; Note, supra
note 7, at 97-98, but this explanation fails to account for copyright-secured lending ils
the motion picture industry, since films are also difficult to value prior to release, Howe,
Bankers and Movie-Makers, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS: AMERIC.N FILM INDUSTRY PRACTICE,
supra, at 57-58.
A better explanation for the comparative lack of copyright-secured financing in other
industries may be found in the unique capital requirements of motion picture production.
The work of an individual composer or author requires little capital investment, particu-
larly if he is willing to lihe modestly until the work is published; a motion picture,
however, requires props, film, and the work of numerous persons who are unlikely to be
willing to defer wage claims until the picture is completed and earning profits. Since tle
publishing industry can therefore operate without large advances of funds, it can, unlike
the motion picture industry, afford to avoid the legal problems inherent in copyright
production financing.
If the legal problems were resolved, however, writers and composers of stature, whose
unpublished works in progress would be valuable, might be tempted to finance their
work with loans seemed by the copyright to such work for the same reason that inde.
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The practice of motion picture creditors under the old Copyright
Act was to file a mortgage of the common law copyright to the photo-
play at the appropriate state records office before advancing funds for
production."0 The accretion of portions of the picture as production
proceeded amounted to the addition of after-acquired property to which
a perfected security interest automatically attached. 17 Upon comple-
tion of production, a statutory copyright was secured by registering the
photoplay at the Copyright Office, where a mortgage of the statutory
copyright was then recorded to perfect the security interest in the new
copyright.' The danger to the creditor was that, if the producer
secured a statutory copyright without notifying the creditor, then
another transferee might be the first to record an interest therein.19 If
the transferee took his interest in good faith, then the interest of the
creditor would be subordinated.
20
pendent motion picture producers turned to this pattern of financing: to enhance their
artistic independence by securing greater financial independence from the corporations
that distribute and sell their work, see Nelson, The Independent Producer, 254 ANNALS 49,
55 (1947); Picker, The Film Company as Financier/Distributor, in THE MOVIE BUSINESS:
AMERICAN FILM INDUSTRY PRACTICE, supra, at 95-96.
Another candidate for copyright production finance, one outside the traditional copy-
right industry, is the rapidly growing computer software business. Although software com-
panies originally produced specialized products for a few large customers, they have begun
to develop inventories of programs that can be sold or leased to many customers. Elliot,
Thinking Big, BARRONS, Sept. 18, 1967, at 3; Software Marketplace Reflects Realignment
of Users, 3 COMPIUTERWORLD 83 (1969). A statutory copyright in computer programs has
been recognized since 1964, Copiyright Registration for Comtputer Programs-Announce-
ient From the Cofyright Office, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 361 (1964), and the use ef
indihidual programs by many customers will increase the importance of copyright protec-
tion and the value of the copyright as commercial property. Since a single program may
cost as much as SI million to develop, THE EcoNoMisT, April 22, 1978, at 106, outside
financing may be necessary. The source, whether a commercial lender or a large cus-
tomer, of funds to develop a program might find it prudent to secure its loan with the
copyright to the program. Concerning the size of the software industry, see Boehm, Soft-
ware and its Impact: A Quantitative Assessment, DATAMATION, May 1973, at 48 (industry
accounts for over S10 billion of gross national product).
16. Concoff, supra note 4, at 1236. For an example of such an arrangement, see
Carnegie Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 642, 645 (1973), and for the banker's point
of view, see Howe, supra note 15.
17. See U.C.C. § 9-204(l) ("[Al security agreement may provide that any or all obliga-
tions cotcrcd by the security agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral");
Concoff, supra note 4, at 1236-37.
18. Concoff, supra note 4, at 1236-37.
19. See note 14 supra; Concoff, supra note 4, at 1237. Concoff has speculated that the
gap between registration and recording might be eliminated by recording a mortgage with
an after-acquired property clause at the Copyright Office before advancing funds. He
cautioned, however, that there was no authority for the validity of mortgages executed
prior to the existence of the statutory copyright. Id. at 1237-38.
20. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 30 (1970) ("Every assignment of copyright shall
be recorded in the copyright office ... in default of which it shall be void against any
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice, whose
assignment has been duly recorded.")
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II. Security Transfers of Unregistered Copyrights
Under the New Copyright Act
Under the old Copyright Act, transfers of pre-registration, common
law copyrights were vulnerable because the common law copyright was
extinguished when the statutory copyright was secured by registration.
2 1
The new Copyright Act abolishes the common law copyright,22 pro-
vides statutory copyright protection from the moment a work is first
fixed in a copy,2 3 and does not require registration as a condition of
protection.
2 4
Transfers of statutory copyright can therefore now be effected before
registration, and pre-registration transferees no longer need fear the
loss of their collateral upon registration; nevertheless, pre-registration
security interests in copyrights are more vulnerable than ever to
subordination.
A. Subordination Under the New Copyright Act
As between two transferees of an interest in a copyright, the new
Copyright Act gives priority to the first to record his transfer in "the
manner required to give constructive notice." 25 Although the new Act
provides that "any transfer of copyright or other document pertaining
to a copyright may be recorded at the Copyright Office," 26 recording a
document gives constructive notice of its contents only if two require-
ments are met. The document must identify the work so that, once the
21. See pp. 127-28.
22. The Act states:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright . . . , are governed exclusively by this title. [After
January 1, 1978], no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any
such work under the common law or statutes of any state.
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. § 301(a) (1976).
23. See note 9 supra.
24. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. § 408(a) (1976) ("registration is not a condi-
tion of copyright protection"). Registration remains important for some purposes. See,
e.g., id. § 411 (registration is prerequisite to infringement suit).
25. Id. § 205(e):
As between two conflicting transfers, the one executed first prevails if it is recorded,
in the manner required to give constructive notice under subsection (c), within one
month after its execution in the United States or within two months after its execu-
tion outside the United States, or at any time before recordation in such manner of
the later transfer. Otherwise the later transfer prevails if recorded first in such
manner, and if taken in good faith, for valuable consideration or on the basis of a
binding promise to pay royalties, and without notice of the earlier transfer.
26. Id. § 205(a):
Any transfer of copyright ownership or other document pertaining to a copyright
may be recorded in the Copyright Office if the document filed for rccordation bears
the actual signature of the person who executed it, or if it is accompanied by a sworn
or official certification that it is a true copy of the original, signed document.
130
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document is indexed, it will be revealed by a reasonable search under
the title or registration number of the work, 27 and the work itself must
be registered.28 Together, these requirements have the effect of deny-
ing constructive notice status to a recorded document transferring copy-
right ownership unless third parties are put in a position to trace
ownership through the title index, commencing with the original,
registering owner.
29
Third parties are therefore not on constructive notice of security
interests in a copyright, even if recorded, until the copyright is regis-
tered. If two transferees record their interests before registration, the
earlier transferee, even if he is the first to record, cannot be certain of
priority, for it is not clear that he is the first to record in "the manner
required to give constructive notice." 3° A pre-registration transferee,
moreover, risks that the author will fraudulently or mistakenly register
the work under a title different from the title shown in the document
recorded by the transferee. If this happens, the interest of the pre-
registration transferee will be inferior to that of any subsequent good
faith transferee who does record under the registered title, even though
the latter records later in time.31
To ensure his priority over subsequent transferees, a creditor should
therefore insist that the work be registered before he advances funds
and then refer to the registration number or registered title in the
27. Id. § 205(c):
Recordation of a document in the Copyright Office gives all persons constructive
notice of the facts stated in the document, but only if-(l) the document, or material
attached to it, specifically identifies the work to which it pertains so that, after the
document is indexed by the Register of Copyrights, it would be revealed by a reason-
able search under the title or registration number of the work; and (2) registration
has been made for the work.
28. Id.
29. See HousE Coit. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89rH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION
PART 6, at 77 (Comm. Print. 1965) (Copyright Act adds "another condition for according a
recorded document the effect of constructive notice, that registration for the work has been
made. This woult establish the basis of the copyright covered by the document, and
would enable persons searching the records to trace title to the copyright from the
original owner.") *
30. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. § 205(e) (1976), quoted in note 25 supra.
31. Consider the following hypothetical case. S plans to produce a movie entitled What
You Will. To finance production, he borrows from A and gives the copyright as collateral.
A immediately and properly records the security agreement, which identifies the movie-
to-be by its title What You Will. As production proceeds, S also borrows money from B,
again giving the copyright as collateral. B is told that the movie is to be entitled Twelfth
Night. B promptly and properly records the security agreement. When the movie is com-
pleted, S registers it under the title Twelfth Night. Since A's security agreement would not
be revealed by a reasonable search under the title or registration number of the work, his
recordation does not give constructive notice, whereas B's recordation does. See id.
§ 205(c), quoted in note 27 su ra. B therefore has priority over A. See id. § 205(e), quoted
in note 25 supra.
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record of transfer. This precaution, however, is not available to the
creditor who lends to enable completion of the work, for registration is
impractical, if not impossible, until the work is completed. The Copy-
right Office may refuse to register an uncompleted work.32 Further-
more, the copyright to the portions of the work produced after regis-
tration would not be covered,3 3 so that the creditor would not be fully
protected unless he went through the costly and otherwise senseless
process of continually re-registering the work throughout its pro-
duction.
34
B. Subordination Under Article 9
In order to perfect a security interest in intangible property such
as copyright, a creditor ordinarily must file in a state filing office
an Article 9 "financing statement" that identifies the creditor, the
debtor, and the collateral, 35 but, since the Copyright Act provides for
recording of security transfers and for priority among transferees, state
regulation of secured transactions in copyrights may be preempted.
Although there has been little litigation to mark the boundary
between federal and state law in this field, at least two points are clear.
First, both the old and new Copyright Acts require that transfers for
security be in writing3 6 and that they be recorded at the Copyright
32. A photoplay, for example, will be registered only when it has reached a stage of
completion such that it tells "a connected story." 37 C.F.R. § 202.15(a) (1977).
33. A work may be registered at any time during the subsistence of the cop)right,
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. § 408(a) (1976), and statutory copyright subsists only
in work fixed in a copy, see note 9 supra. Thus, a registration that purports to cover
later additions to the work extant at the time of registration would be without effect
as to those additions. The later and larger work that included the additions would be
a "derivative work" of the portion already registered, see Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. app. § 101 (1976) ("A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elabora-
tions, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship,
is a 'derivative work.' "), and the copyright in the added material would be "independent"
of the copyright in the preexisting work, see id. § 103(b).
34. The practice has been to register only when the work is completed. See Concoff,
supra note 4, at 1236.
35. See U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (formal requisites of financing statement). An Article 9
security interest is perfected "when it has attached and when all of the applicable steps
required for perfection have been taken." Id. § 9-303(1). The requirements for attach-
ment, specified in § 9-203 of the U.C.C., are of no concern here. The applicable step for
perfection of a security interest in a copyright is the filing of a "financing statement" in
the appropriate public office; this is true for all "general intangibles," since such
collateral does not fall under any of the exceptions to Article 9's general filing require-
ment. See id. § 9-106, Comment (copyrights are general intangibles); id. § 9-305, Comment
1 (general intangibles perfected only by filing).
36. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. § 204(a) (1976) ("A transfer of copyright
ownership, other than by operation of law, is not valid unless an instrument of convey-
ance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, is in writing .... "); Copyright Act of
1909, 17 U.S.C. § 28 (1970) (repealed 1976) ("Copyrights secured under this title . .. may
be ... mortgaged by an instrument in writing .... ")
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Office in order to achieve priority over certain other transfers.3 7 State
law cannot eliminate these recording requirements or reverse the estab-
lished priority. Second, copyright law does not preempt all security
law concerning copyrights. In the case of Republic Pictures Corp. v.
Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles,38 decided under the old
Copyright Act, the court held that a federal court did not have juris-
diction to foreclose a mortgage of a copyright.30 The court reasoned
that questions of copyright assignment did not arise under a federal
statute even though the copyright itself originated under one.40 Pro-
fessor Gilmore, noting that " '[flederal law is generally interstitial in
its nature'" and "'builds upon legal relationships established by the
states, altering or supplanting them only so far as is necessary for [its]
special purpose,' "41 takes Republic Pictures to stand for the proposition
that federal copyright law preempts state security law only in the
limited areas of recording and the effect of recording on priority.4
2
If Congress had enacted a comprehensive security Statute for copy-
rights,4 3 federal preemption would of course be complete. The new
Copyright Act, however, is far from comprehensive. It makes no
reference at all to the perfection of security interests or to the effect of
perfection on priorities, and its priority rule only works in situations
in which all claimants are transferees and in which at least one has
recorded in "the manner required to give constructive notice.' 44 When
the new Copyright Act is silent on priority, as it is, for example,
between two security transferees of an unregistered copyright 5 or
between a security transferee and a lien creditor, Article 9 governs
the rights of a copyright-secured creditor.
4"
37. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. § 205(e) (1976), quoted in note 25 supra;
Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 30 (1970) (repealed 1976), quoted in note 20 supra.
38. 197 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1952).
39. Id. at 768. Republic Pictures continues to be the law under the new Copyright Act,
since Congress rejected a federal system of mortgage foreclosure, HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 5738, that had been proposed by the motion picture industry, HOUSE CO.INI. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SEss., supra note 4, at 306 (statement of Motion Picture
Association of America, Inc.) (consideration should be given as to "whether a uniform
federally enforceable system of foreclosure might be spelled out in the copyright statute").
40. 197 F.2d at 770.
41. 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 13.1, at 402 (quoting H. HART & H. IVECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 435 (1953)).
42. Id. § 13.3, at 415.
43. The most nearly comprehensive federal security statute is the Ship Mortgage Act,
46 U.S.C. §§ 911-961 (1970). 1 G. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 13.2, at 405. See generally G.
Gm.OmR & C. BLACK, ThE LAw OF ADMI.RALTY 586-817 (1957).
44. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. § 205(e) (1976).
45. See p. 131 supra.
46. The case of In re Leslie-Judge Co., 272 F. 886 (2d Cir. 1921), has been taken to hold
the contrary, i.e., that security interests in copyright can only be perfected by recording
at the Copyright Office. See I G. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 13.3, at 415. In Leslie-judge, a
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The Uniform Commercial Code might therefore have provided that,
in order to perfect a security interest against subsequent lien creditors,
a copyright creditor must follow Article 9's procedures for filing a
financing statement in a state filing office. Instead, section 9-302 pro-
vides that compliance with federal statutes that have their own filing
provisions is "equivalent to the filing of a financing statement under
this Article, and a security interest in property subject to the statute
* . . can be perfected only by compliance therewith . . .. "47 Because
of this provision, creditors are spared a double filing-a state filing to
perfect against lien creditors under Article 9 and a federal filing to
obtain priority over subsequent transferees under the Copyright Act.
In order to comply with the new Copyright Act, the creditor must
look to its general filing requirements, since the Act does not contain
any special requirements for filings pursuant to state security law. The
Act provides generally that "any ... document pertaining to a copyright
may be recorded," provided only that the document be signed by the
party executing it.4 s There is no requirement that the copyright be
registered.49 A creditor could therefore meet the minimum filing
requirements of the new Copyright Act without putting third parties
on constructive notice, since filing a document at the Copyright Office
gives constructive notice of its contents only if it identifies a registered
copyright. 50 It would be an odd result if such a filing were made the
equivalent of an Article 9 filing by section 9-302, since the purpose
of filing security interests is to give notice to the public.51
The Comments to section 9-302, however, indicate that, for purposes
of perfecting a security interest, compliance with the Copyright Act
requires more than a mere recording. Comment 1 states that the
transactions described in section 9-302(3) are those "where suitable
alternative systems for giving public notice are available."5 2 The
drafters of Article 9 apparently anticipated that compliance with the
mortgage of various properties, including copyrights, was invalidated on several grounds,
including a failure to record at the Copyright Office. 272 F. at 888. Although Professor
Gilmore cautions that the statement in Leslie-Judge that copyrights "can be mortgaged
only under the federal copyright law," id., was not a "reasoned conclusion," 1 G. GILMORE,
supra note 1, § 13.3, at 412, he describes the case as "soundly decided," id. at 415. This
description is debatable. See Note, supra note 7, at 93. Neither the old nor the new
Act makes recording a condition of a mortgage's validity other than against a specific and
limited class of transferees. See notes 20 & 25 supra.
47. u.c.c. § 9-302(4).
48. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. § 205(a) (1976).
49. Id. § 408(a); see note 24 supra.
50. Id. § 205(c); see pp. 131-32 supra.
51. P. COOGAN, WV. HOGAN, & D. VAGTS, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORNI
COMMERCIAL CODE § 601[3]; I G. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 15.3, at 471-80; see U.C.C. § 9-
402, Comment 2 (§ 9-402 adopts "system of 'notice filing' ").
52. U.C.C. § 9.302, Comment 1.
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federal statutes to which the section refers would give adequate notice.
Accordingly, Comment 8 specifically excludes the Assignment of
Claims Act from the application of section 9-302.3 because its filing
system was not "designed to give notice to creditors."' '
4
The alternative system for giving public notice under the new Copy-
right Act is section 205, which requires, for constructive notice of a
copyright transfer, not only that the transfer be recorded but also that
the work itself be registered.- Compliance with the Copyright Act for
the purposes of section 9-302 will therefore entail both registration and
recording. This creates a problem for the creditor financing the
production of a copyrightable work, such as a motion picture. Al-
though he may file a security agreement at the Copyright Office before
making his loan, his security interest remains unperfected until the
work being financed is completed and registered. Until then, his rights
in the collateral are subordinated by Article 9 to the rights of lien
creditors, transferees for value without notice, and prior-attaching
secured creditors. 56
III. Security Transfers of Copyright Under the Bankruptcy Act
In addition to frustrating the efforts of copyright-secured creditors
to obtain priority under the Copyright Act and perfect their interests
under Article 9, the priority and recording provisions of the new Copy-
right Act expose these security interests to avoidance in bankruptcy.
A. Avoidance Under Sections 70(c) and 60(b)
A security interest in a copyright remains unperfected until the
underlying work is completed and registered,57 and, while the interest
53. See id., Comment 8 ("An assignee of a claim against the United States, who must
of course comply with the Assignment of Claims Act, must also file under this Article in
order to perfect his security interest against creditors and transferees of his assignor.")
54. 1 G. GILMORE, stifira note 1, § 19.10, at 547.
55. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. § 205(c) (1976). Under the old Copyright Act,
which was in effect when Article 9 was drafted and enacted, recording a transfer served to
give constructive notice to all third persons of the facts disclosed in the recorded in-
strument, HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., COPYRIGHT Lv REVISION
96 (Comm. Print 1961), but under the old Act, there was no statutory copyright at all
without registration (or publication with notice), so that the old provisions regarding
consiuctie notice were functionally equivalent to the n6w ones, i.e., in effect both
registration and recordation were required to give constructive notice of a transfer of
statutory copyright (to unpublished work).
556. U.C.C. § 9.301(1). Unperfected security interests are, inter alia, subordinate to the
rights of (a) persons entitled to priority under Section 9-312, such as holders of prior-
attaching unperfected security interests under § 9-312(5)(b); (b) persons who become lien
creditors before the security interest is perfected; and (c) transferees to the extent that
they give value without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. Id.
57. See pp. 132-35 supra.
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is unperfected, it is subordinate to the rights of subsequent lien
creditors. 58 Under section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 59 the trustee
in bankruptcy has the status of a lien creditor on the eve of bank-
ruptcy; he can therefore avoid a security interest in a copyright if the
bankruptcy petition is filed before registration. 0
Although the security interest will become perfected when the under-
lying work is completed and registered, under certain circumstances
the interest will continue to be vulnerable to avoidance under section
60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 60 empowers the trustee in bank-
ruptcy to avoid transfers made by an insolvent debtor during the four
months preceding bankruptcy if the transfer was made "on account of
an antecedent debt" and if the effect of the transfer was to enable the
transferee to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than another
creditor of the same class.61
Under section 60, a transfer for security is deemed to occur at the
point in time when a subsequent lien creditor can no longer gain
superior rights over the transferee.02 For transfers of general intan-
gibles, including copyrights, a proper Article 9 filing usually marks
that point in time,0 3 and for transfers of copyrights, a proper Article
58. U.C.C. § 9-301(1).
59. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1976) ("The trustee shall have as of the
date of bankruptcy the rights and powers of: (1) a creditor who obtained a judgment
against the bankrupt upon the date of bankruptcy, whether or not such a creditor
exists .... ")
60. See 2 G. GILMORE, suPra note 1, § 45.3.2. (consequences of § 70(c) to secured
creditors before and after enactment of Article 9); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAw UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-3 (1972) (rights of trustee under
§ 70(c)).
61. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a), (b), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a), (b) (1976). Two other conditions
must also be met: the debtor must be insolvent at the time of transfer and the creditor
must have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent at that time. Id.; see 2
G. GILMORE, supra note 1, § 45.3.3-.6; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 60, § 24-4.
62. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1976):
[A] transfer of property other than real property shall be deemed to have been made
or suffered at the time when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon
such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could
become superior to the rights of the transferee.
63. See In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971) (transfer of security interest
deemed to have occurred for purposes of § 60(a)(2) of Bankruptcy Act on date of filing of
security interest); DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1288 (9th Cir. 1969) (because secured
creditor filed financing statement before four month period preceding bankruptcy, his
"security interest is immune from the trustee's preference challenge"); Grain Merchants
v. Union Bank and Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 212 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 827 (1969)
(security interest in accounts receivable "'so far perfected' when . . . financing statements
were filed . . . that [transfer of security interest] must be deemed to have been made
then").
The Bankruptcy Act provides for a twenty-one day grace period in which to make tile
filing. Bankruptcy Act § 60(a)(7)(1), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7)(I) (1976). Professor Gilmore con-
cludes that this grace period would also apply to filings under federal statutes like tile
Copyright Act. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note I, § 45.8, at 1529.
136
Security Transfers of Copyrights
9 filing entails registration. 64 Thus, security transfers of copyrights
will be deemed to occur at the later of registration or recording and
will be on account of antecedent debt with respect to funds advanced
prior to registration. Not only, therefore, is the interest of the copy-
right production creditor voidable if bankruptcy occurs before reg-
istration; under some circumstances, it is also subject to avoidance
if bankruptcy occurs within four months thereafter.
B. Avoidance Under Section 60(aX6)
The provisions of Article 9 that confer priority on perfected security
interests over subsequent liens and other interests6 5 must of course give
way to the priority provisions of the new Copyright Act.,6 The latter
provide that the interest of a transferee who has not recorded in a
manner that gives constructive notice is subordinate to the interest of
a subsequent, good faith transferee who has done so.67 Section 60(a)(6)
of the Bankruptcy Act invalidates a security interest if the secured party
fails to take an "overt action" that is a precondition of the security
interest's "full validity against third persons other than a buyer in the
ordinary course of trade." 68 Since the Copyright Act makes registration
a precondition of the priority rights of copyright-secured creditors
against subsequent good faith transferees (a category that includes
"persons other than a buyer in the ordinary course of trade"), the
bankruptcy court may invoke section 60(a)(6) to deny recognition to
64. See p. 132 supra.
65. U.C.C. §§ 9-312 to -315.
66. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. § 205(e) (1976).
67. The latter interest must be taken in good faith, for valuable consideration, and
without notice of the former. Id.
68. Section 60(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(6) (1976), provides:
The recognition of equitable liens where available means of perfecting legal liens
have not been employed is hereby declared to be contrary to the policy of this section.
If a transfer is for security and if (A) applicable law requires a signed and delivered
writing, or a delivery of possession, or a filing or recording, or other like overt action
as a condition to its full validity against third persons other than a buyer in the
ordinary course of trade claiming through or under the transferor and (B) such overt
action has not been taken, and (C) such transfer results in the acquisition of only an
equitable lien, then such transfer is not perfected within the meaning of paragraph
(2) of this subdivision. Notwithstanding the first sentence of paragraph (2) of this
subdivision, it shall not suffice to perfect a transfer which creates an equitable lien
such as is described in the first sentence of this paragraph, that it is made for a
valuable consideration and that both parties intend to perfect it and that they take
action sufficient to effect a transfer as against liens by legal or equitable proceedings
on a simple contract ....
This section has been interpreted as authorizing avoidance of transfers that could have
been perfected against third parties, but were not, even if under state law 'they were
perfected against subsequent liens. See 2 G. GILM1ORE, supra note 1, § 45.7, at 1324.
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security interests in copyrights if bankruptcy occurs before the un-
derlying work is registered.69
C. Avoidance Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Reform Act
Under the present Bankruptcy Act, a security transfer is deemed
made when a proper Article 9 filing has occurred.70 Under the pro-
posed reform of the Act,71 however, a transfer for security will not be
deemed made until the debtor has also acquired rights in the collat-
eral.72 Since the new Copyright Act recognizes an author's copyright
only from the time his work is fixed in a copy,73 a transfer of a copy-
right for security will not be deemed to have been made, for purposes
of the proposed reform of the Bankruptcy Act, until that time. Con-
sequently, the copyright subsisting in all work produced subsequent
to the advancement of the funds that financed the production of the
work will be deemed to have been transferred on account of antecedent
debt, and a security interest in the copyright to work produced during
the ninety-day period preceding bankruptcy will be voidable.
7 4
69. Professor Countryman has argued that purchase money security interests in con-
sumer goods may be voidable under § 60(a)(6) on similar grounds. Countryman, Code
Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 Cost. L.J. 269, 270-71 (1970). Purchase money security
interests in consumer goods are perfected without filing, U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d), but filing is
required to defeat subsequent good faith purchasers for value, id. § 9-307(2). Countryman
argues that, since the "overt action" of filing is necessary to defeat a class of subsequent
transferees that is larger than "buyer[s] in the ordinary course of trade," failure to file,
even though it perfects against subsequent lienors, would postpone the date of transfer for
purposes of § 60(a) to the eve of bankruptcy, rendering the transfer subject to avoidance
as a preference under § 60(b). Countryman, supra, at 270-71. Countryman's theory has not
yet been tested in any reported case.
There is no equivalent to § 60(a)(6) in the proposed reform of the Bankruptcy Act. See
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc.
No. 137, pt. 1, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. 205 (1973) (hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY COMMIISSION
REPORT].
70. See pp. 136-37 supra.
71. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sss., 123 CONG. REC. 6838 (daily ed. July 11, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Proposed Bankruptcy Reform]. The bill was passed by the House of
Representatives on February 1, 1978. See 124 CONG. REC. H478 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1978). Thc
Senate version is S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S18244 (daily ed. Oct. 31,
1977).
72. See Proposed Bankruptcy Reform, § 547(e)(3) ("For the purposes of this section, a
transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred.")
73. See note 9 supra.
74. See Proposed Bankruptcy Reform § 547(b):
ITihe trustee may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt ...
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition. ....
Note the change in the avoidance period from four months to ninety days. See Kennedy,
The Report of the Bankrup tcy Conitnssion: The First Five Chapters of the Proposed New
Bankruptcy Act, 49 IND. L.J. 422 (197-1).
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An exception to the more stringent avoidance rules under the
proposed reform is made for interests in inventory, which will be
voidable only to the extent that an excess of the secured debt over the
value of the inventory is reduced during the avoidance period.75 The
definition of "inventory" in the proposed reform does not expressly
exclude copyrights; 7 6 nevertheless, the definition was borrowed from
section 9-109 of the Uniform Commercial Code,77 and other provisions
of the Code make clear that the term does not include copyrights.78
IV. A Proposal
The creditor's problems originate with the statutory requirement of
registration for constructive notice. Because of this requirement, a
creditor financing a copyright production can neither ensure his
priority under the new Copyright Act nor perfect his security interest
under Article 9. His interest is thereby exposed to subordination both
in and out of bankruptcy.
The legislative history of the Copyright Act suggests that the registra-
tion requirement was meant to facilitate title searches by allowing the
searcher to follow the chain of title from the author79 and by relieving
the searcher of the responsibility for looking beyond a single index.80
In the case of completed, registered works of authorship, th! require-
ment that transferees key their recordings to the initial registration as
a condition of constructive notice is not burdensome. In the case of
unregistered works, however, this requirement will work hardship on
transferees by preventing them from giving notice of their rights in a
copyright simply because the underlying work is not in a state fit to
be registered. This hardship is unnecessary because a title searcher
75. Proposed Bankruptcy Reform, § 547(c); see Kronman, The Treatment of Security
Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Proposed Bantruptcy Act, 124 U. PA. L.
REV. 110 (1975).
76. See Proposed Bankruptcy Reform, § 547(a)(1) (defining "inventory" as "personal
property leased or furnished, held for sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract
for service, raw materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business,
including farm products such as crops or livestock, held for sale or lease").
77. The drafters of the relevant provisions had in mind "to effect coordination with
the Uniform Commercial Code," BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 69, pt. 2,
at 169, and the Bankruptcy Commission reported to Congress that the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act definition of inventory would differ from the Code definition only in that the
former would include farm products, id. at 173.
78. Compare U.C.C. § 9-109(4) (inventory consists of goods) with id. § 9-106 (general
intangibles are not goods), and id., Comment (copyrights are general intangibles).
79. HOUSE CO'MM. ON TiE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESs., supra note 29, at 77.
80. 'his purpose is not brought out in the legislative history of the Act, but it is
implicit in the limitation of constructive notice to documents revealed by reasonable
searches under the title index. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. app. § 205(c)(1) (1976).
139
The Yale Law Journal
can easily inform himself of the transferee's interest by an examination
of the files at the Copyright Office. Copyright transfers are indexed
by the names of the transferor and transferee, as well as by the title
of the underlying work.81 It would not unduly burden searchers of
title to unregistered works to examine the transferor index under the
name of the party with whom he is dealing to determine the interests
of other parties in the work.
The system would therefore both facilitate commercial transactions
secured by copyrights and simplify copyright production financing
with only a slightly greater burden on title searchers if the registration
requirement were eliminated from section 205(c) of the new Copyright
Act. 82 Under this proposal, a transferee would still be required to key
his recording into the registration system, but not before the work is
registered. If he recorded before registration, he would take the risk,
as he does now, that the work might be registered under a different
title and his recording would be denied constructive notice. Preregistra-
tion transferees must continue to bear this risk so that post-registration
title searchers can rely on the title index.
The proposed amendment would greatly simplify copyright produc-
tion financing. Since recording the security transfer would give con-
structive notice of the security interest, recording would be the
equivalent of filing an Article 9 financing statement and a perfected
security interest would attach to the copyright of the work as it was
produced. The perfected security interest would not be vulnerable to
avoidance in bankruptcy by a trustee exercising his section 70(c) lien
creditor powers; nor would it be susceptible to non-recognition under
section 60(a)(6), since the additional "overt act" of registration would
no longer be required to obtain priority over "third persons other than
a buyer in the ordinary course of trade."8
Because recording would mark the moment in time after which sub-
sequent lien creditors could no longer obtain superior rights, it would
be deemed to mark the time of transfer for purposes of section 60 of
81. Letter from Chief of Information Center and Reference Center, Copyright Office,
to Author, Feb. 17, 1978 (copy on file with Yale Law Journal).
82. Specifically, section 205(c) should be amended by adding the italicized language and
deleting the bracketed language, as follows:
§ 205(c) RECORDATION AS CONSTRUCTIVE NorcE.-Recordation of a document in the
Copyright Office gives all persons constructive notice of the facts stated in the
recorded document, but only if [-(1)] the document, or material attached to it,
specifically identifies the work to which it pertains so that, after the document is
indexed by the Register of Copyrights and the work is registered, it would be revealed
by a reasonable search under the title or registration number of the work E; and (2)
registration has been made for the work].
83. Bankruptcy Act, § 60(a)(6), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(6) (1976).
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the Bankruptcy Act. If the creditor recorded before making his loan,
the transfer would not be on account of antecedent debt and thus would
not be voidable as a preference under section 60(b).
Under the proposed reform of the Bankruptcy Act, a transfer is not
deemed to have occurred until the debtor himself has rights in the
collateral. Since a statutory copyright does not subsist until the work
itself is in esse, a transfer of a security interest in work produced after
a loan is made will be deemed to have occurred on account of
antecedent debt and will be voidable as a preference if bankruptcy
occurs within ninety days of production of the collateral. Amending
the new Copyright Act as suggested will not avoid this result, and
financers of copyrightable work must expect to share with other
creditors the value of work produced within the last ninety days preced-
ing bankruptcy; however, this is the result intended by the drafters of
the proposed reform and is not peculiar to security transfers of copy-
rights.
Conclusion
This modest proposal would not defeat the purposes of the new
Copyright Act, the Bankruptcy Act, or the Uniform Commercial Code;
on the contrary, it would support the policies behind thes statutes.
There are those who believe that the secured creditor is already unduly
protected under the Bankruptcy Act,8 4 but the creditor secured by
copyrights should not be singled out for reduced protection. The pro-
posal would merely afford such creditors the rights in bankruptcy
generally enjoyed by other secured creditors. It would further the
Article 9 policy of facilitating secured transactions in all commercial
property and, most importantly, it would put an end to the legal
obstruction of security transfers of copyrights, making available an
important mechanism for financing the creative efforts that the Copy-
right Act exists to protect.8
84. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 69, at 269-70.
85. The constitutionally enunciated purpose of the Copyright Act is "to promote . . .
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their
. . Writings." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
